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1 IN T R O D U C T IO N
The Uruguay Round was successfully concluded on April 15, 1994, in Marrakesh, when 
more than 100 countries signed the Final Act and the World Trade Organization (W T O ) Agreement.2 
These legal texts, including Ministerial Decisions and Declarations, provide detailed rules for 
traditional areas in the international trading system. M ore important, new multilateral rules to include 
the protection o f intellectual property rights and trade in services considerably enlarged the scope o f 
international obligations. Furthermore, an improved dispute settlement mechanism became integrated 
into the new W TO .3 A  recent assessment prepared by U N C T A D  underlined the significance o f these 
accomplishments in the normative area: "A major result has been that a range o f measures previously 
viewed as falling within the scope o f domestic policy has been brought under multilateral discipline, 
and linked to the rights and obligations governing international trade and access to markets."4
In 1995, when the World Trade Organization (W T O ) will become operational, 
multilateralism will be in a situation without parallel in history. Never before, a single institution with 
contractual obligations binding its members encompassed such a wide array o f issues and conflictive 
interests o f a near universal set o f nations.5 Difficulties to reach agreement on equitable and
1 Acting D irector o f  the Brazilian office o f the Economic Commission for Latin Am erica and the Caribbean, 
E C L A C . The views and opinions expressed in this paper are personal and may not necessarily coincide with those o f 
EC LA C .
2 In December 1994, the Final Act was ratified by the European Parliament, by the United States Congress and 
by the Japanese Parliament. In  the same period it was also formally approved by the Brazilian Congress.
3 The Marrakesh agreement establishing the W orld Trade Organization includes four annexes. The legal texts 
are composed o f a large number o f multilateral agreements which can be summarized as follows: (1 ) The General 
Agreem ent on Tariffs and Trade 1994 consolidating several amendments to provisions o f the General Agreement on 
Tariffs  and Trade o f 1947 (six understandings on the interpretation o f several articles and a Marrakesh Protocol); (2 ) 
M ultilateral Agreements on technical barriers to trade, trade-related investment measures, dumping investigation (article 
V I) ,  customs valuation (article V I I ) ,  preshipment inspection, rules o f origin, import licensing procedures, subsidies and 
countervailing measures and safeguards; (3 ) Multilateral agreements to improve market access on textiles and clothing 
and agriculture w ith the purpose o f integrating those sectors to the international legal trading system; (4 ) a General 
Agreem ent on Trade in Services; (5 ) an Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects o f Intellectual Property Rights; (6 ) the 
adoption o f integrated rules and procedures governing the settlement o f disputes and (7 ) Plurilateral Trade Agreements 
including trade in civil aircraft, govemmnet procurement, international dairy and international bovine meat agreements. 
Several M inisterial Decisions and Declarations were also adopted. See G A T T  ( 1994), The Results o f the Uruguay Round 
o f Multilateral Trade Negotiations - The Legal Texts. Geneva.
4 U N C T A D  (1 9 9 4 ), Trade and Development Report 1994. United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, Geneva, p. 121.
enforceable solutions will be inevitable but the outcomes o f trade and trade-related disputes are 
indeterminate. The expansion o f private corporations' activities has increased not decreased the need 
for an orderly and predictable economic environment. A  larger number o f enterprises from all regions 
are competing for markets globally. Moreover, powerful economies as the United States, are as much 
dependent on foreign markets for their sustained growth as the world is dependent on their markets.6 
However, the linkages between economic interdependence and political actions are not 
straightforwards. Industrial countries are reluctant to have their capacity to respond to domestic 
interests curtailed by supranational norms. Consequently, developing countries are afraid that the 
W T O  w ill not provide the protection they need from arbitrary unilateral actions emanating from 
powerful trading partners. During the Uruguay Round negotiations, they found themselves in the 
awkward position o f replacing industrial countries in the defense o f a multilateral legal order. They 
had to defend a rule-based system with no real power to enforce it.7
Uncertainties over the future o f multilateralism underscored the emergence over the past 
years, and in parallel to multilateral negotiations, o f a variety o f regional and subregional trade 
arrangements. At the same time, the membership o f past arrangements was extended and their 
coverage widened. Fears were expressed that those regional trade arrangements could act as 
stumbling blocks to the multilateral trading system. However, several studies have already shown 
that the dynamics o f trade o f most regions contradicted the proposition o f global fragmentation.8
In my perception, the recent moves towards cooperation at the regional and subregional 
levels have one important aspect that should not be neglected. It  is the learning dimension that adds 
to other dynamic gains from regional economic integration. Those dynamic components o f regional 
initiatives are beneficial to multilateralism in the new environment o f international competition. As 
mentioned elsewhere, regional initiatives may "represent positive integrative responses to the 
pressures exerted by globalization. I f  accompanied by parallel progress at the G A TT, regionalization 
could be a potent mechanism for freeing world trade and investment and harmonizing national
5 Although U nited Nations agencies deal with complex sets o f issues at the multilateral level there are no 
contractual obligations on member countries.
6 I  thank Prof. A lbert Fishlow for pointing this point out to me, although I  am sceptical on the political results 
o f such economic interdependence.
7 In  the words o f a Brazilian Ambassador who participated in the Uruguay Round Negotiations: "Hay en esa 
situación una paradoja de difícil solución ya que la razón que debe llevar a estos países a interesarse en mantener el 
sistema, es decir, la falta de poder y su mayor vulnerabilidad, es la misma que los hace incapaces de asumir dicho papel, 
en caso de que no haya cooperación por parte de los grandes" (Ricupero, Rubens (1994 ), "Los Países en Desarrollo y 
la Ronda Uruguay: Desencuentros de un A m or no Correspondido?" in Leiva, Patricio (ed.) La Ronda Uruguay v el 
Desarrollo de America Latina. C LEP I, Santiago, p. 71).
8 Fishlow, Albert and Stephan Haggard (1992), The United States and the Régionalisation o f the W orld  
Econom y. O E C D , Development Center, Paris; Frankel, Jeffrey A . (19 9 1 ), "Is a Yen Bloc Forming in Pacific Asia?"in 
Finance and the International Economy, n. 5, pp. 5-20; Lawrence, Robert Z. (1991 ), "Emerging Regional Arrangements: 
Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks" in Finance and The International Economy, n. 5, pp. 23-35. Recent data show, 
however, that Asian markets have become more important for Asian countries, for goods, services and investment. Intra- 
A sian trade accounted for 42 .4%  o f all Asian merchandise exports in 1990 and for 44 .5%  in 1992 (G A T T , 1993, 
International Trade. Geneva, table I I .51, p. 36).
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institutional practices."9 Globalization and the interdependence o f economies have created the need 
for higher levels o f policy coordination and harmonization among countries. I f  regionalism evolves 
within the framework o f open regionalism, smaller groupings can be effective instruments for 
developing countries to cope with the complexities o f deep integration.10
The characteristics o f smaller and more homogeneous groups may allow developing 
countries to become more familiar with the requirements o f policy coordination and harmonization. 
This experience becomes relevant when levels o f integration previously associated with customs union 
formation are demanded at the multilateral level.11 Policy coordination and harmonization are part o f 
the negotiations o f the topics o f the future agenda o f negotiations: the link between trade and 
environment, trade and competition policies, trade and internationally recognized labour standards, 
among others.12 Industrial countries, non-governmental organizations and some international agencies 
look forwards to introducing extra-trade but trade-related issues in one multilateral organization such 
as the W TO . Contractual obligations and the application o f economic sanctions are the most attractive 
features o f W TO . In many ways, this is the result o f the successful inclusion in the Uruguay Round 
agenda o f non-trade topics such as the protection o f intellectual property rights. I f  the protection o f 
those rights could be assured by the threat o f legal trade sanctions, then the protection o f other rights 
such as those o f internationally recognized labour standards or environmental protection could also 
be enforced multilaterally.
High and stable levels o f long-term unemployment in major European countries, the nature 
o f new jobs and downward trends in wages in all industrial countries have created demands for urgent 
actions to protect existing levels o f employment. Mostly, to protect them from foreign competition. 
Multilateralism will be under growing difficulties to separate measures aiming at protecting legitimate 
domestic interests from mere protectionism. There is weak evidence o f linkages between job losses 
and foreign competition. But, even though there is no adequate framework to analyse current trends, 
the process o f globalization, technological innovation and changes in the labour process are related 
to the dynamics o f job destruction and creation.
Developing countries, particularly the more industrialized such as Brazil, are worried with 
the attempts o f industrial countries to include issues such as "social protection" in trade discussions 
to accommodate domestic pressures from trade unions and politicians. Those attempts are perceived
9 Lawrence, 1991: 23.
10 See E C L A C  (1994) Open Regionalism in Latin America and the Caribbean (Economic Integration as a
Contribution to Changing Production Patterns w ith Social F.auitv: LC /G . 1801 /Rev. 1 -P, September, Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago, Chile, United Nations publication Sales n. E .94 .II.G .3 ; Lawrence, Robert 
Z  (1991a), "Perspectivas del Sistema de Comercio Mundial e Implicaciones para los Países en Desarrollo" in Pensamiento 
Iberoamericano, n. 20, pp. 53-78.
11 In  1957, the Rome Treaty established as one o f the objectives o f  the European Community ..."the gradual 
convergence o f the conomic policies o f  the m ember states."
12 See U N C T A D  ( 1994ai. The Outcome o f the Uruguay Round: A n  In itia l Assessment/ Supporting Papers to the 
Trade and Development Report. 1994. U nited Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva:221-225, for a 
review o f  future issues.
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as new bargaining leverages that industrial countries want to establish to maintain their status-quo. 
The dissemination o f expressions such as "social dumping" contributes to obscure the terms o f the 
debate.
Brazil has been traditionally active in international economic diplomacy. The country (with 
Chile) was among the few independent developing countries who were the founding members o f 
G A TT (and also o f all other international organizations). Brazilian diplomacy played an important role 
in the Tokyo Round negotiations and in the whole process o f the Uruguay Round.13 The country is 
classified as a global trader by the diversification o f its exports and markets. As such, the expansion 
o f its trade requires open markets and also, clear and enforceable multilateral rules. Therefore, Brazil 
is totally committed to the strengthening o f a multilateral order. Nevertheless, Brazilian diplomacy has 
been behind the revival o f the L A IA  (Latin American Integration Association) and, the creation and 
consolidation o f the Southern Cone Common Market (M ERC O SUR ). In 1994, the Brazilian 
government put forwards a proposal for a Southern American Free Trade Area (ALCSA) to integrate 
countries from the M ER C O SU R  with those o f the Andean Group plus Chile.14
In  spite o f having established a national industry behind protective tariff and non-tariff 
measures, Brazilian economy has always been very open to foreign capital. In 1987 Brazil went into 
a process o f unilateral liberalization o f its trade policy, moving from a nominal average tariff rate o f 
90% for manufactured products in 1984 to 14.2% in 1994.15 The construction o f the M ER C O SU R  
began almost simultaneously with the liberalization o f trade policies o f Brazil and Argentina.
This paper is exploratory and provocative. It  will take some years for the impact o f W TO  
on world trade to be felt. Therefore, there are only expectations on its future effectiveness. The new 
issues present important normative aspects. Most o f the questions raised by the new competitive 
environment are interdisciplinary by nature and lack a solid theoretical framework for a positive 
analysis.16 Topics such as the economics o f environment or the rights and obligations related to 
environmental protection are controversial. In addition, it is difficult to include the subject o f policy 
coordination and harmonization in the free trade framework.
First, I  hold that globalization and the complexities o f interdependence are transforming the 
content o f international negotiations. This is to say, that the inclusion o f issues o f policy coordination 
and harmonization changes the characteristics o f negotiations originally aimed at freer trade and
13 See Winham, Gilbert R. (1 986) International Trade and the Tokvo Rouond Negotiation. Princeton University  
Press, Princeton, N ew  Jersey; Leiva, Patricio (ed.) (1994 La Ronda Uruguay v el Desarrollo de América Latina. CLEPI, 
Santiago.
14 See Edwards, Sebastian ( 1993), "Latin American Economic Integration: A  N ew  Perspective on an O ld  Dream" 
in The W orld Economy, vol. 16, n. 3, M ay, pp. 317-338 for a recent review o f Latin American integration initiatives. See 
also E C L A C , 1994; Bouzas, Roberto et al. ( 1993), Los Procesos de Integración en America Latina. Fundación C E D E A L , 
Madrid.
15 Fritsch, Winston and Gustavo H. B. Franco (1993), " The Political Economy o f Trade and Industrial Policy
Reform in Brazil in the 1990s" in E C L A C , Série Reformas de Política Pública, n. 6, Santiago, Chile, pp. 14 and 30.
16 As a side effect o f the inclusion o f new themes in trade negotiations, trade analysts' were forced to enlarge 
their knowledge and to become more fam iliar w ith a multidisplinary approach to trade questions.
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market liberalization. Second, I  think that the difficulties o f policy coordination and harmonization are 
better handled within smaller and more homogeneous groups. Therefore, the negotiating process o f  
regional and sub-regional economic arrangements can be a preparatory stage to the global debate o f 
similar topics in W TO . Finally, I  claim that there is a consensus in Latin America and particularly in 
Brazil that their economies should move from spurious to legitimate competitiveness.17 However, 
trade sanctions are not adequate instruments to correct deep and ingrained problems. Ultimately they 
are the expression o f lower levels o f national economic integration in developing countries and 
moreover, o f world asymmetries.
The next section will elaborate on the difficulties for an effective enforcement o f multilateral 
rules dealing with a broad array o f domestic policies. Nevertheless, I  hold that interstate cooperation 
is possible and necessary although large heterogeneous groups and complex trade-related issues may 
reduce its effectiveness. The debate on policy harmonization generates two sets o f dilemmas: (i) the 
accommodation o f the domestic policies o f industrial countries or groups o f countries to principles, 
norms, rules and procedures multilaterally agreed and (ii) the requirement by industrial countries that 
developing countries adopt higher standards o f "social protection". Section 3 examine the state o f the 
policy harmonization debate. Some questions raised by the inclusion o f trade and environment and 
trade and internationally recognized labour standards in the future negotiating agenda are examined. 
In section 4 selected normative aspects o f the recent process for the creation o f the Southern Cone 
Common Market (M ERC OSUR ) are summarized. Finally, section 5 presents a few concluding 
remarks.
2 P O L IT IC S , P O W E R  A N D  L A W
Uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity characterize contemporary international relations. 
On the economic side, administrative decisions to correct or to reinforce market signals have 
contributed to alter the composition and volume o f trade flows. Consequently, international 
competition patterns have also been transformed with new industrializing countries competing in 
world markets. On the political side, the multipolarity in power configuration created challenges and 
opportunities to small economies while introducing instability to the multilateral system.18
17 These concepts were developed by Fernando Fajnzylber in several books and articles starting w ith (1983), 
La industrialización trunca de América Latina. Editorial Nueva Imagen, M exico. Spurious competitiveness is that based 
on the predatory exploitation o f natural resources and low-wage labour. Legitimate competitiveness is that based on the 
introduction o f technical change and innovation in products and production processes. See also, E C LA C  (1990 )  
Changing Production Patterns with Social Equity: The Prime Task o f Latin Am erican and Caribbean Development in the 
1990s. (LC/G. 1601 -P), Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago, Chile, March. United Nations 
publication, Sales n. E .90 .II.G .6 .
18 Other trends in the domains o f money and finance, transnational corporation strategies, technological 
innovation and obsolescence, and in information technology are behind the complexities o f world economy.
The United States ceased to be a primus inter pares to become one o f the three countries 
or groups o f countries concentrating world production, trade, investments and income.19 Second, the 
growing number o f players in world scene has upset the power hierarchy that prevailed at the end o f 
the Second World War. Although the most important new players are countries such as Germany, 
Japan, China, and groups o f countries as the European Union, the opportunities opened by new 
technologies and by the international liquidity o f the 1970s allowed some developing countries to 
"leap frog" and become competitive exporting economies. This is the case o f Brazil. In addition, 
interdependencies created by trade and investment allowed the same developing countries to improve 
their bargaining power vis-à-vis industrial countries. Furthermore, the protracted multilateral trade 
negotiations taught countries to identify common interests and to establish effective coalitions 
between small economies beyond their classification as industrial or developing countries.20
A fter cultivating a culture o f isolation and self-sufficiency, the firms and workers o f the 
United States became more exposed to foreign competition. Competition came from goods originated 
in industrial and developing countries and from foreign production in domestic soil.21 Changes in 
United States hegemonic power22 and also in its trade policy and trade policymaking process have 
raised concerns on the stability o f international regimes.23 Particularly worrisome were: (i) the 
increasing dominance o f local interest groups in shaping the United States trade policy;24 (ii) the 
adoption by the country o f a multi-track strategy that included unilateral, bilateral, and plurilateral 
initiatives addressing to issues that were simultaneously being dealt with in the multilateral forum of 
the G ATT; and (iii) the aggressive attitude o f the United States to force foreign governments to 
change their domestic policies considered detrimental to the interests o f the United States.25
19 The so-called tr ia d  - United States, the European Union and Japan - accounted for 44%  o f world exports, 
43.8%  o f world imports and 70 .5%  o f world income in 1992 (W orld  Bank ( 1994), W orld Development Report 1994: and 
G A T T , 1993, International Trade, table 1.5, p. 4).
20 The Caim s Group is a good example o f a successful coalition between industrial and developing countries.
21 See Reich. 1987. Tales o f a N ew  Am erica. Times Books. N ew  York.
22 In  the theory o f hegemonic stability, the hegemon is a country able and w illing to supply a public good such
as international security or trade liberalization rules. A  public good has several characteristics in the literature one o f 
which is the inevitable presence o f free-riders . Lately, the United States became increasingly concerned w ith the 
"consumption" o f trade liberalization by developing countries. Those countries being small suppliers could by the 
principle o f nondiscrimination take a fre e -rid e  in trade negotiations. Therefore, they received trade concessions without 
"paying" for them.
23 Keohane, Robert (1984 ), A fter Hegemony (Cooperation and Discord in the W orld Political Economvf. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, N ew  Jersey.
24 Low, Patrick (1993), Trading Free (The G A T T  and U S  Trade PolicvL The Twentieth Century Fund, N ew  York; 
Destler, I. M . (1986/1992), American Trade Politics. Institute for International Economics, Washington, D  C.; and Winham, 
(  1986) hold that the Reciprocal Trade Act o f 1934 provided the United States Congress with an effective net to insulate 
itse lf from  sectoral protectionist interests. The delegation o f the exercise o f its Constitutional trade policy powers to the 
President permitted some maneuvering capacity to the Congress towards their constituencies without endangering the 
international negotiating process. A t least from  the 1930s and up to the 1960s, "the main story o f American trade policy 
m aking was the story o f  the construction and elaboration o f a pressure-diverting policy management system. "(Destler, 
1986/1992: 37).
25 Low  (1993); Destler, (19896 /1992).
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I t  is not my intention to review the literature on hegemonic stability. The debate on the 
determinants o f economic and political cooperation in the absence o f a dominant single nation has 
been inconclusive. For some authors, the hegemonic decline argument can at most have a descriptive 
value. First, it is unlikely that the historical conditions that originated the absolute hegemony o f 
England and the United States could be reproduced in the near future.26 Second, the theory fails to 
analyse the dynamics o f internal processes in hegemonic countries and the longer-term systemic 
implications; and finally, it does not explain the dynamics o f the interaction between special interests 
groups and governments' responses to these internal pressures.27
Other analysts prefer to lay emphasis in the privileged situation o f the United States at the 
end o f the Second World War. I f  1955 is used as a benchmark, changes in the relative position o f the 
United States in world trade are not so dramatic: the country accounted for 16.5% o f world exports 
in 1955; this share decreased to roughly 11% in the 1980s to increase again to 12% in 1992-3. The 
situation on the import side bears more significance: in 1955, the country accounted for 12.2% o f 
world imports and this share was stable until the early 1980s; then, it increased to almost 17% (due 
to an overvalued dollar) and reached 14.4% in 1992-93.28 Furthermore, a point that is less stressed 
is that trade is a two-way avenue. The integration o f the United States economy in world economy 
can only increase, not decrease.29 The export coefficient increased from 4.9%  in 1960 to 10.6% in 
1992 and the trade coefficient increased from 9.3% to 21.7% (when the sum o f exports and imports 
is considered).30 Moreover, export growth explained more than 60% o f the past recovery o f the 
United States economy.31
Besides, international cooperation can be studied as a form o f collective action, borrowing 
concepts and approaches from the theory o f rational-choice and the theory o f institutions. Institutions 
are necessary because they reduce uncertainties o f the economic environment. Under the assumptions 
o f bounded rationality and imperfect information o f individual participants, it can be shown that 
cooperation will be maintained even after the conditions that permitted its existence have disappeared. 
Individual countries will cooperate because they judge that they will have more to lose by not joining 
the proposed institutional framework or international regime. However, cooperation does not imply 
the absence o f conflicts. This is to say that it does not imply "harmony o f interests" .32 There is nothing
26 "Hegemonic leadership is unlikely to be revived in this century for the United States or any other country. 
Hegemonic powers have historically only emerged after world wars..." (Keohane, 1984: 9). England hegemony began after 
the end o f the Napoleonic wars and that o f the United States after the Second W orld War.
27 Low  (1993: 18).
28 D ata from Fishlow and Haggard ( 1992) and G A T T , 1993, opus cit..
29 That point was recognized by the United States Administration: "There is simply no way to close America' 
s borders and return to the insular days o f the 1950s and 1960s" (United States Government ( 1994), Economic Report o f 
the President. Washington, p. 45).
30 In  1992, one in each six United Sates manufacturing jobs was directly or indirectly related to exports (United  
States Government, 1994, opus cit. p. 207).
31 A  report by the International Trade Administration estimated that "between 1988 and 1992 export growth
accounted for almost 6 0%  o f overall growth in the United States" (The Journal o f Commerce. September 30, 1994).
32 This expression is due to Carr, (1939 /1984), The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939. The M acm illan Press, 
London., pp. 41 -62 . H e criticized the doctrine o f the harmony o f interests as part o f the liberal utopia o f the eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-centuries.
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to assure that all divergent interests o f participating nations can become mutually compatible. 
Therefore, the stability o f  international regimes is not granted and power solutions are not excluded. 
This is the dilemma faced by the new W TO.
But, even accepting that multilateral cooperation is feasible, it is important to point ou to 
critical changes that have occurred in its content. Also, to suggest the role that the state and state 
policies have played in shaping those changes.
Over the entire postwar period, governments and private corporations concurred to change 
the structure o f international production and trade. Through the adequate manipulation o f domestic 
prices and markets, and the use o f incentives designed to channel investments to desired industries, 
governments have systematically changed a "given" comparative advantage pattern. Simultaneously, 
private and public corporations accumulated resources to organize production in different countries. 
Those large corporations move goods and services across frontiers and yet these transactions remain 
within the domain o f the firm.33 Intrafirm transactions are internal to the corporation; they do not 
occur via the market.34 Equally important, subsidies and regulations could, inter allia, persuade 
transnational corporations to start export operations in the country and/or to increase the domestic 
content o f their final products. On the other extreme, income policies by industrial countries aiming 
at preventing structural adjustments as dictated by market factors introduced dramatic distortions in 
international specialization trends.35
It  took more than seven years for Uruguay Round negotiators to reach an agreement. 
Actually, the period o f negotiations exceeded twelve years when the four years o f technical and 
diplomatic preparatory work are added. In addition, the Tokyo Round took another seven years and 
at its conclusion in 1979, negotiators were already defining a new agenda o f negotiations. Therefore, 
that Round o f Multilateral Trade Negotiations ended up being just the beginning o f a long period o f 
trying to cope with the complexities o f the new trading issues.36 Consequently, trade specialists and 
diplomats have spent more than two decades trying to frame principles, norms, rules and procedures 
for the new competitive environment o f production, investment and trade.
Although, both private and public agents' growth strategies have influenced trade and 
investment flows, trade negotiations are about public policies and instruments. In the G A TT,
33 "By 1990, multinational firms accounted for over 75 percent o f total U .S. merchandise trade, and around 40  
percent o f U .S. merchandise trade was intrafirm." (United States Government, 1994, opus cit., p. 207).
34 Intra-firm trade accounted for 46 .3%  o f United States imports from Europe, 75%  o f United States imports from  
Japan and 4 5 %  o f  total United States imports (United States Government ( 1994), Economic Report o f the President. 
W ashington, table 6 .6 , p. 218). The high level o f intrafirm transactions in United States imports from Japan was used in 
the Report as evidence o f Japanese imperfectly competitive practices and markets. The fact that intra-corporate 
transactions are less responsive to normal price and cost determinants than arm 's length transactions and the importance 
o f Japanese keiretsu in Japanese trade could explain the resilience o f Japanese exports regardless o f the overvalued yen.
35 R aul Prebisch forecasted in 1964: "A new order is thus emerging among the more advanced industrialized 
States and the next few  years w ill reveal its ultimate significance more clearly." ("Towards a N ew  Trade Policy for 
Development", Report by the Secretary General o f U N C T A D , 1964, p.8).
35 For a detailed description o f the learning process in the Tokyo Round see W inham  ( 1986).
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negotiations moved first from tariff reduction to non-tariff measures, subsidies and government 
procurement. Later, in the Uruguay Round, "trade-related effects o f1 non-trade-related domestic 
policies such as those associated with the protection o f intellectual property rights or several others 
pertinent to trade in services were introduced to the negotiations. In many ways, the international 
convergence o f technological information and capabilities among developed and a small number o f 
developing countries promoted by domestic policies changed the nature o f the multilateral debate. 
Ultimately, the purpose o f the negotiations is not the reduction o f governmental intervention for 
improved market operation anymore. The debate is now on improved policy instruments to prevent 
competition patterns to alter.
Lawrence (1991a) has diffused the concepts o f shallow and deep integration. Accordingly, 
shallow integration is associated with trade measures applied at the border. Deep integration includes 
measures beyond the border. Tussie (1994: 4) in a very insightful article, recalled that the ideas o f  
negative and positive integration were part o f traditional customs union literature. Negative 
integration should be pursued to prevent tariff negotiations to be nullified by non-tariff barriers such 
as technical or health standards, customs rules or procedures. Therefore, during the process o f 
integration, governments would agree to eliminate policy instruments that could offset the 
liberalization effects. Positive integration refers to rules relating to the conditions o f production that 
should be negotiated ex-ante to the negotiations for freeing trade. ”
The underlying framework o f the G A TT system was that o f negative integration.38 Tariffs 
and quantitative restrictions should be removed to permit international trade specialization according 
to market signals. The base o f the G A TT  system has been the Most Favoured Nation (M F N ) clause 
(nondiscriminatory treatment) which converts bilateral trade concessions into multilateral trade 
liberalization. In the postwar, the process o f tariff reduction through mutually advantageous 
negotiations guaranteed the permanence o f the G A TT  as the major forum for multilateral trade 
negotiations, at least for manufactured products and for trade among industrial countries.
Several authors agreed that G A TT was successful in providing guidelines for national trade 
policies in the first two or three decades o f existence. However, that success had to be qualified. 
G ATT was in many ways the victim o f its success in lowering tariffs and limiting the use o f quotas. 
These accomplishments weakened the very instruments that had made the success possible since tariff 
reductions made the impact o f active policies by governments more visible.39 Another author 
underlined that the negligible levels o f the import weighted average tariff rates o f industrial countries, 
after the Tokyo Round, rather than suggesting the victory o f trade liberalization pointed to the 
redundancy o f tariffs as trade instruments.40 In addition, liberalization affected mostly sectors
37 "Negative harmonization aims to ensure that governments honour agreed-upon market access. It  serves to
lay the ground for ta riff reductions to operate more effectively. Yet border measures are seen here to be the ultimate trade 
policy tool. Positive harmonization would aim at enforcing specific common rules that w ill define how exactly economic 
affairs are to be conducted." (Tussie (1994), "The policy harmonization debate: what can developing countries gain from  
multilateral negotiations" in U N C T A D  Review p. 4).
38 Tussie, 1994: 5.
39 Destler (1986 /1992:34-35 )
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characterized by intraindustrial specialization, economies o f scale, product differentiation, imperfect 
competition and intra-firm trade.41
Governments tried to reduce socially disruptive domestic adjustments costs and national 
economic and political potential vulnerabilities that could result from international functional 
differentiation. This is the differentiation derived from Ricardian interindustrial comparative advantage 
that could benefit developing countries.42 Consequently, commodities, resource-based goods, textile 
and clothing remained outside G ATT rules for a long period. Developing countries were consciously 
discriminated in their access to industrial country markets.43 The Marrakesh agreements did very little 
to redress that situation.
There are costs and benefits associated with trade; however, their nature is remarkably 
divergent. Eventual benefits from trade are broad, undifferentiated and conjectural whereas costs are 
real, measurable and concentrated. In the theory o f comparative advantage, no costs o f adjustment 
exist.44 There is instantaneous adjustment. In real life, firms, workers and whole cities will bear the 
costs of adjustment to changing comparative advantage in world markets. Governments will benefit 
from their unequal power bargaining to transfer these costs away from their constituencies. The major 
question on the future operation o f the new W TO  refers to the administration o f those adjustment 
costs.
The fact that non-tariff instruments o f trade distortions are more intertwined with issues o f 
domestic policies and national sovereignty make negotiations difficult and inject more instability to 
the system. It  is important to stress that one central quality o f the G A T T  was its "policy tolerance"
40 "By 1987, when the full extent o f the Tokyo Round tariff reductions became effective during the course o f the
Uruguay Round, import weighted average tariff rates reached about 4 .3%  for the U S A  and 6%  por the EEC  o f Nine. For 
Japan which had brought forward the full implementation o f its cuts by M arch 1983, the equivalent figure was 2.9% . The 
ta riff thus lost much o f its traditional significance as en effective means o f protection. "(Tussie, 1994: 3).
41 Ruggie, John Gerard (1982 ), "International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the
postwar economic order" in International Organization, vol. 36, n. 2, Spring, pp. 398-404; Tussie, D iana (1989 ) The Less 
Developed Countries and the W orld Trading System: A  Challenge to the G A T T . Pinter Publishers, N ew  York, pp. 38-63.
42 "Intraindustry trade, it is sometimes argued, is o f particular importance because the adjustment costs
associated w ith an expansion o f intraindustry trade are thought to be lower than for a comparable expansion o f 
interindustry trade - import-competing firms can retool and specialize rather than disappear. I f  this is so, expansion o f 
intraindustry trade should be more compatible with trade liberalization" (United States Government (1994), opus cit. p. 
217).
43 Q uoting Raul Prebisch again: "The measures adopted in those countries and the social motives underlying
them are understandable: they do not wish the benefits o f greater productivity to be transferred to other sectors to the 
detriment o f producers. It  is not this policy we have to discuss but rather the fact that the harmful effects o f such 
measures on the primary exporting countries do no appear to be taken sufficiently into account" (Report o f the Secretary 
General o f U N C T A D , 1964. p. 10).
44 According to Hagelstam ( 1991:100) the Ricardian theory o f trade was essentially consumer-oriented. The full 
use o f com parative advantage would ensure that consumers had the largest volume o f products at their disposal at the 
best prices. However, economists are blind to the fact that the promotion o f consumption is rarely a pnm aiy objective 
o f trade policy. (Hagelstam, Jarl, 1991 "Mercantilism still influences practice trade policy at the end o f the twentieth 
century" in Journal o f W orld Trade, vol. 25, A pril, n. 2, pags. 95-105).
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regarding domestic policies o f industrial countries.45 Domestic policy diversity was admitted and no 
previous policy harmonization was required outside the realm o f tariffs and quotas.46 That was part 
o f the international consensus that provided stability to the international trading system. In other 
words, international trade policies conformed to domestic policies and were compatible with the 
requirements o f domestic policies. Current pressures on nations to change their domestic subsidy, 
regulation, and procurement policies take a different path.
During the first phase o f its existence, the G A TT  was often criticized for validating 
mercantilist behaviour and practices by individual countries. Yet, despite the attraction o f free trade 
for trade theorists countries have always been concerned with freer trade and reciprocity o f 
concessions in terms o f market access. These were measurable aspects o f the quid-pro-quo that 
enabled governments to restrain domestic interest groups. For the United States, changing from tariff 
negotiations into negotiating non tariff barriers removed part o f the leverage that the G A TT could 
exert in domestic bargaining.47 When non-tariff policies are introduced, the domestic costs o f making 
concessions are easier to estimate than to evaluate the gains from "reciprocal" national concessions. 
Additionally, when trade instruments moved away from tariffs into a wide array o f non-tariff 
measures, free trade was replaced by subjective concepts, such as fa ir  trade and effective market 
access.
The general debate on the domestic regulatory systems that emerged from the Uruguay 
Round opened a new area o f policy convergence. Negotiations moved from tariff negotiations to 
rule-making negotiations; from measures applied at the border to the harmonization o f national rules 
and standards. In other words, "Global harmonization o f domestic practices has become an 
internationally negotiable proposition."48
Two major aspects o f enlarging the scope o f trade negotiations have to be considered. They 
are related to the dilemmas created by the ambiguous nature o f the policy harmonization debate. A  
first set o f questions refers to the effectiveness o f a rule-based system o f economic international 
relations. This is to say, the effectiveness o f W TO  to protect small economies from actions unilaterally 
defined by stronger partners. For that to be true, industrial countries should adjust their domestic 
policies to make them compatible with multilaterally agreed norms, rules and principles. There are 
doubts that the new trade organization can discourage domestic sectoral interest groups in industrial
45 "The G A T T  system had not been predicated on making all countries identical. Like the principle o f equal
treatment before the law, it was justified on the opposite proposition that differences were many and various." (Tussie, 
1994:5 ).
46 Tussie (1994 : 5 ) concluded that in W IP O  (W orld  Intellectual Protection Organization), the protection o f
intellectual property rights, accepting the principle o f national treatment, obliged countries to follow disciplines on the 
form  o f protection, but countries were free to legislate on the subject matter and on the level o f protection they thought 
that should be accorded.
47 Destler (1986 /1992:35-37 ).
48 Tussie, 1994:2.
countries or groups o f countries from asserting the power o f those nations (and their high income 
markets) in countervailing multilateral obligations.49
The other set o f questions follows from the first. Politicians in the United States and in 
European countries have to assure their constituencies that rather than to use a minimum common 
denominator in international integration higher standards in "social protection" will prevail. Hence, 
seriously or not, industrial countries are decided to uniformize ex-ante the conditions o f production 
in developing countries. As mentioned, the agreement on the protection o f intellectual property rights 
already represented an important step towards the extension o f industrial country domestic policies 
to developing countries. The current debate on generalizing to all countries both the levels o f 
environment protection and o f labour standards o f industrial countries will expand further the 
expectations o f policy harmonization as a precondition for market access, although not necessarily 
for freer trade.
3. P O L IC Y  H A R M O N IZ A T IO N  A N D  D E V E L O P IN G  C O U N T R IE S
Developing countries and other small economies are aware o f the issues at stake when 
power regulates international relations. After being virtually neglected, in the first decade o f the 
G A T T  and becoming politely tolerated in the following two decades, developing countries were 
converted in scapegoats o f the crumbling international order o f the 1980s. To shift the discussion 
away from the impact o f their own macro and microeconomic policies on trade and investment flows, 
industrial countries insisted that developing countries should accept new multilateral obligations. 
Positive and defensive reasons gradually led developing countries to replace their stance concerning 
the G ATT by a firm commitment to a rule-based multilateral trading system.50 They hope that a rule- 
based trading system can "restrain the exercise o f power"and preempt unilateral policy making.S1
49 The editorial o f The N ew  York Times. Novem ber 29, 1994, "For Freer Trade and Better Jobs" stated: " First,
critics say that the W .T .O . threatens U.S. sovereignty because it can rule that U.S. environmental and safety laws are 
form s o f backdoor protectionism. In one sense, the criticism has to be true: any agreement w ith other nations necessarily 
restricts U .S. action. But the danger is grossly exaggerated. G A T T  panels can rule against U .S. laws even under existing 
rules. These rules would survive even if  the new accord were defeated. There is one difference. Under existing rules the 
U.S. can veto an adverse ruling; under the new accord it cannot. B u t in practice this is a m in o r distinction. Even though  
countries can now retaliate against the U.S. fo r such a  veto, most do not do so out o f fe a r  th a t the U .S . w ould re ta lia te  
in  tu rn . T h a t is like ly  to be the case und er the new G A T T ;  in th a t sense, the  accord poses no new threat..."  (my 
stress).
50 The phrase o f Lacordaire explains the defense o f multilateralism by developing countries: "Entre le faible et
le fort, c'est la liberté qui opprime et la loi qui libère".
51 A  recent assessment by the Brazilian M inister o f Foreign Relations stressed the importance o f multilateral 
norms to protect small economies from arbitrary actions from stronger partners: "Without m inim izing the importance o f 
quantitative gains, the most important results from the Uruguay Round are those related to the normative part. The Final 
A ct reduces considerably the margin o f arbitrariness concerning the application o f anti dumping and countervailing 
duties measures, and safeguards, eliminating gray area measures." (Am orim , Celso (1 9 9 4 ), "América Latina en el nuevo 
orden económico después de la Ronda Uruguay" in Leiva (éd.), p. 65, my translation).
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During the negotiations, Brazil and India had a leading role in the heroic attempts by 
developing countries to block unfair requirements o f "paying" for the restoration to G A TT  rules o f 
areas, such as agriculture, textile and clothing, withdrawn by industrial countries. Power relations 
forced developing countries to accept an undesired exchange o f concessions in new areas o f trade 
policy, such as trade in services and protection o f intellectual property rights, for past due access to 
industrial countries' markets.
The protection o f intellectual property rights (PIPR) was discussed within multilateral trade 
negotiations aiming at linking PIPR to multilateral trade rights and obligations as a component o f the 
international trading system. It  is not my intention to discuss the costs and benefits o f a harmonized 
legal system on intellectual property rights. A  preliminary evaluation by U N C T A D  (1994a: 197) 
estimated that the acceptance by all countries, despite their level o f technological development, o f a 
pattern o f stronger legal protection will have important implications for the transfer and diffusion o f 
technology in technology-importing countries. Although the longer-term systemic implications might 
be positive, in the short run costs will increase.52
The policy harmonization debate emerged in the Uruguay Round in connection with PIPR.53 
After the successful introduction of PIPR into the G A TT system, groups differently motivated wanted 
to benefit from the binding obligations o f the new W TO , including trade sanctions, to force countries 
to accept "adequate levels o f social protection". In other words, to use the trade system for purposes 
other than trade. Regardless o f the moral significance o f those issues, however, the focus o f the 
solution should not shift away from the specific objectives such as the reduction o f environmental 
destruction or the upgrading o f labour conditions. Moreover, the multilateral trading system should 
not be used to force countries to accept domestic preferences o f other countries via trade measures.
There are fundamental differences between negotiating market liberalization and improved 
"social protection". Such objectives move in opposite directions as far as market forces and state 
actions are concerned. As Bhagwati underlined, trade and environmentalism do not share the same 
fundamentals: "Trade ...suggests abstention from governmental intervention, whereas
environmentalism suggests its necessity".54 Market liberalization indicates a movement towards the 
removal o f policies and obstacles to the full operation o f market forces. Negotiations for the extension
52 ...( i)  stronger protection may be used by foreign intellectual property holders to preserve import rights rather
than to w ork the technology locally or to licence it to other firms; (ii)  even where suppliers are interested in transferring 
their protected technology stronger protection would further enhance their bargaining power and allow them to charge 
higher prices. (Additionally, increases in such payments are sought by reducing the potential number o f imitators and 
therefore the potential number o f competing suppliers o f protected technologies) (U N C T A D , 1994a: 197).
53 A  recent document by IL O  states that "The protection o f intellectual property was once a matter for voluntary
action o f States within the framework o f the W IP O . The value o f goods and services that are put on the international 
market increasingly lies in their intellectual component...This is why a very important chapter on this matter was included 
in the Final Act o f the Uruguay Round, which lays down for the first time international standards o f protection and the 
procedures and coercive measures that governments should make provision for in their domestic law ..."(ILO  (1994), The 
social dimensions o f the liberalization o f  world trade. International labour Office, Governing Body, Working Party on the 
Social Dimensions o f the Liberalization oflntem ational Trade, doc. GB.261 /W P /S L D /1 . Geneva, November, p. 6, § 4).
54 Bhagwati, Jagdish ( 1993), " The Case for Free Trade" in Scientific American. November, p. 42.
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o f domestic regulations in industrial to developing countries assume a greater role o f the state in 
counteracting market-determined results.
Trade and Environment
Issues related to trade and environment were initially introduced into G A TT  and U N C T A D  
as part o f the preparatory work for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 
(UNCED) which was held in Rio de Janeiro, on June 1992. A  Group on Environmental Measures and 
International Trade was created in G A TT by November 1991. Later, its working programme was 
extended in July 1992 to integrate the activities defined for the follow-up o f the U N C E D .55 During 
the past three years o f discussions their members tried to identify the compatibility and a positive 
relationship between policies aimed at environmental protection, trade and sustainable development.56 
Several legal documents approved at the Conference contain provisions dealing with trade and 
sustainable development. As it is usual in United Nations documents, broad and balanced principles 
were part o f the Rio Declaration.57 Commitment to sustainable development was expressed in the 
Preamble o f the W TO  Agreement.58 In addition, a Ministerial Decision was approved according to 
which a Committee on Trade and Environment will be established at the first meeting o f the General 
Council o f the W TO .59
G A TT documents affirmed that the trade organization should not engage in the revision o f 
national environmental priorities, neither in establishing environmental norms nor in the elaboration
55 Chapter 2 o f the Agenda 21 (International Cooperation to Accelerate Sustainable Development in Developing  
Countries and Related Domestic Policies) stated in 2.3. "The international economy should provide a supportive 
international climate for achieving environment and development goals by: (a) promoting sustainable development 
through trade liberalization; (b) making trade and environment mutually supportive; (c) providing adequate financial 
resources to developing countries...; (d) encouraging macroeconomic policies conducive to environment and development". 
Programme Area B o f chapter 2 deals with "making trade and environment mutually supportive" and refers to the role o f 
agencies as G A T T  and U N C T A D  in the follow-up.
56 The Group was not conceived as a negotiating forum but to examine and to analyse trade-related questions 
derived from the documents approved in U N C E D  92 (See Trade and the Environment. TE  004, 26.11.1993, p. 3)..
57 Principle 12 o f R io Declaration asserts: "States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open 
international economic system that would lead to economic growth and sustainable development in all countries, to better 
address the problems o f environmental degradation. Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not 
constitute a means o f arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. Unilateral 
actions to deal w ith environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction o f  the importing country should be avoided. 
Environm ental measures addresssing transboundary or global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be 
based on an international consensus."
58 "Recognizing that their relations in the field o f trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a 
view to raising standards o f living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume o f real income and 
effective demand, and expanding the production o f and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use 
o f the world's resources in accordance with the objective o f sustainable development, seeking both to protect and 
preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and 
concerns at different levels o f  economic development..." (G A T T , 1994: 6).
59 G A T T , 1994:4 70 -471 .
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o f global policies for the environment. The work programme should be focused on trade-related 
effects o f environmental policies encompassing three major aspects: (i) possible conflicts between 
G A TT/W TO  provisions and trade measures adopted in conformity with multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs); (ii) the impact o f G A TT /W TO  provisions and decisions on MEAs; and (iii) the 
role o f trade policies in the promotion o f sustainable development.
In G A TT terms, MEAs proved to be a constructive approach to provide strong international 
action on global environmental problems.60 Questions associated to trade measures can be summarized 
as: (i) the criteria to include trade measures in M EAs and (ii) their consistency with G A TT/W TO  
rules. A  discussion paper was circulated in one o f the Group's meeting in which concerns were 
expressed that G A TT rules could impede the accomplishment o f legitimate trade obligations in MEAs. 
For instance, a country may decide not to join a M E A  which has broad and representative 
international support with the deliberate purpose o f obtaining a commercial advantage from its non­
participation. I f  this conduct threatens to undermine the environmental objectives o f the M E A  should 
not it be legitimate to include trade discrimination measures to discourage such behaviour?
Environmentalists were enraged when in 1992 a G A TT  Dispute Settlement ruled in favour 
o f Mexico and against the United States (and the welfare o f dolphins). In February 1991, the United 
States placed an embargo on the import o f Mexican tuna because Mexicans had used purse seine to 
catch the fish.61 This kind o f net had been banished in the United States because dolphins are killed 
cruelly and in greater number than United States legislation (The Marine Mammal Protection Act o f 
1972) permits. The G A TT  panel ruled against the unilateral actions by the United States for several 
reasons: 1. because the country was unilaterally intervening in the methods hv which Mexico could 
harvest tuna (Art. I l l  o f the G A TT); 2. because the country was extending its domestic laws to 
extraterritorial waters and 3. that the United States had imposed a quantitative restriction violating 
Art. X I  o f the GATT. In addition, the measure was discriminatory because the embargo only affected 
a part o f the fishing area where the United States fleet was not allowed and only a particular kind o f 
tuna. The panel also suggested that trade measures are not the best instruments to enforce 
environmental norms; bilateral cooperation between parties with compensatory provisions for low- 
income countries could be a more adequate way to address the problem.
G A T T  rules can adapt to environment-related trade measures aiming at reducing the 
negative product effects o f trade. The purpose o f trade restrictions is then to regulate the 
international flows o f particular goods to control their environmental effects. There are examples o f 
multilateral trade measures to moderate the detrimental effects o f the disposal o f wastes and to limit 
the extinction o f species: the Basel Convention on the Control o f Transboundary Movements o f
60 The Swedish delegation in one meeting o f the Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade, 
proposed that the negotiation o f  M E A s  continued to be an active area o f environmental policy-making. Most delegations 
insisted that M E A  was an effective and durable approach to environmental problems o f a transboundary or global nature 
and less disruptive to the multilateral trading system than unilateral trade measures. "However, the United States 
reiterated that it saw real practical limitations in certain cases to multilaterally-based solutions" (Trade and the 
Environment. T E  0 0 4 ,2 6 .1 1 .1 9 9 3 , p. 3).
61 Other countries (Venezuela, Costa Rica, France, Italy, Japan and Panama) were also affected by the embargo, 
but only M exico required a G A T T  Panel in September 1991.
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Hazardous Wastes and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species o f Wild Fauna 
and Flora (C ITES). Proposals for trade measures to restrain the use o f processes and production 
methods are more problematic. Trade restrictions linked to processes and production methods can be 
multilaterally agreed when the environmental practices o f one country have impacts on the domestic 
environment o f another country or when the global environment or common resources are at stake. 
This is the case o f the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Countries 
agreed that production processes using CFCs should be curtailed.62
There are multiple questions associated to the best way that trade could contribute to 
sustainable development. This debate has been sometimes confused by moralist and retrograde 
conceptions o f how the environment should be "conserved". Radical conservationists are against 
growth simply because growth increases the supply o f pollution. Therefore they are against trade and 
international especialization that eventually will lead to growth in the use o f resources and pollution. 
A  major problem arises when environmentalists do not separate environmental problems confined 
within domestic boundaries from transboundary or global environmental problems. As with Mexican 
tuna, some o f them assert that a higher-standard country can decide on the production methods o f its 
trading partners. The rationale is that i f  foreign countries do not raise their standards up to higher- 
standards countries the consequence will be that factories will relocate their production to lower- 
standards countries and ultimately, pressures from corporations in the higher-standards countries will 
force down the environmental standards. Moreover, lax environmental requirements by foreign 
governments are perceived as unfair subsidies allowing for unfair competition.
The concept that gained acceptance in the U N C ED  1992 and was included in Principle 16 
o f the Rio Declaration is called "internalization o f external costs" .63 Some environmentalists would 
like to enforce the principle unilaterally without including the qualifications that were carefully drafted 
by negotiators o f the Rio declaration.64 There are statements such as: "The most practical solution is 
to permit nations that internalize costs to levy compensating tariffs on trade with nations that do not" 
therefore "protecting an efficient national policy o f full cost pricing from standards-lowering 
international competition". I f  countervailing duties are allowed by G A TT rules to discourage countries 
from trading in goods at prices below their production costs, "The only real difference is the decision 
to include the costs o f environmental damage and community welfare in that reckoning."65
Governments o f higher-standard countries could prevent the spread o f lower standards of 
environmental protection without limiting free trade "by insisting that their businesses accede to the
62 Stevens, Candice ( 1993), "The Environmental Effects o f Trade" in The W orld Economy, vol. 16, n. 4, July. pp. 
448-449.
63 See U N C T  A D  ( 1994), The effect o f the internalization o f external costs on sustainable development. Report 
by the U N C T A D  secretariat (doc. T D /B /40  (2 )/6 , 7 February).
64 Principle 16 o f the R io Declaration states "National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization 
o f environmental costs and the use o f economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, 
in principle, bear the cost o f pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade 
and investment".
65 A ll quotations from Daly, Herman E. (1993), " The Perils o f Free Trade" in Scientific Am erican. November, p.53.
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higher standards when they go abroad. Such a policy lies entirely within the jurisdictional powers o f 
a higher-standards country. Moreover, the governments o f lower-standards countries would be most 
unlikely to object to such an act o f good citizenship by the foreign investors.1,66 Instead, 
environmentalists prefer to suggest the adoption by the higher-standards country o f a tariff sufficient 
to remove the competitive advantage o f lower standards.67
It  should be emphasized that industrial countries still produce, export and import the bulk 
o f pollution-intensive products.68 An empirical study by Low and Yeats (1992) analysed the imports 
o f such products for the period 1965 to 1988. They found that the share in world trade o f pollution­
intensive goods originating in industrial countries fell from 77.7% to 74.3%; the share o f similar 
products originating in South East Asian countries rose from 3.4% to 8.4% whereas the share o f other 
developing countries remained constant. Other studies showed that pollution-intensive imports in the 
United States and Japan account for a larger share o f total imports in those two countries.69
G A T T  Working Group has shown that G A T T  provisions allow for the maintenance o f  
higher standards o f environmental protection through tariffs i f  two basic principles are not infringed:
(i) national treatment - imported goods should have the same treatment as locally produced goods and
(ii) nondiscriminatory treatment. Nevertheless, products and not processes can be the objects o f trade 
measures. Moreover, a country is not allowed to impose its own environmental standards on others. 
As mentioned, when there are transboundary environmental impacts countries should undertake 
internationally agreed measures.
A  recent review by Markandya (1994) o f empirical studies on the relation between trade and 
environment attempted to analyse two basic questions: (i) i f  actually freer trade and capital flows 
conflict with sustainable development and (ii) i f  the enforcement o f policy instruments for sustainable 
development results in a reduction in the volume o f trade.
Time series and cross-sectional studies on the impact o f trade liberalization measures on 
environmental degradation were not conclusive. Short-term effects o f trade liberalization will be 
adverse to the environment but there are longer-term advantages o f an open economy. On the 
investment side, some empirical studies evaluated the hypothesis o f whether firms locate in countries
66 Bhagwati (1993: 46 ),
67 Daly, 1993: 53.
68 Principle 7 o f the R io Declaration reflects the explicit ackowledgement by industrial countries o f their role as 
the m ajor causes o f environmental pollution: "States shall cooperate in a spirit o f  global partnership to conserve, protect 
and restore the health and integrity o f the Earth's ecosystem. In  view o f the d iffe ren t contributions to global 
en vironm en ta l degradation , States have comm on b u t d iffe ren tia ted  responsibilities. T h e  developed countries 
acknowledge the responsibility th a t they b ear in the in tern atio n a l pursu it o f sustainable developm ent in view o f the  
pressures th e ir  societies place on the global environm ent and o f the  technologies and fin an c ia l resources they  
com m and." (my stress).
69 Low , P. and A. Yeats (1992), "Do dirty industries migrate?" in Low, P. (ed.), International Trade and the
Environm ent. W orld Bank Discussion Papers n. 159, Washington, D .C .; Sorsa, P. ( 1992), "G A T T  and the environment: 
basic issues and some developing country concerns" in Low  (ed.); Robison, H . (1988 ), "Industrial pollution abatement: 
The impact on the balance o f trade" in Canadian Journal o f Economics, vol. 21 as quoted in Markandya, A nil (1 9 9 4 ),"Is 
free trade compatible w ith sustainable development?" in U N C T A D  Review 19 94 . p. 15.
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to take advantage o f lax environmental regulations. Those studies showed that location decisions by 
transnational corporations are most influenced by factors such as labour costs, access to markets and 
the existence o f a developed industrial base. Environmental regulations and corporate tax rate are not 
as important locational factors. A  quantitative analysis on the direct foreign investment by pollution­
intensive industries in developing countries provided weak support to the pollution-migration 
hypothesis; between 1973 and 1985 there was a slight increase in the share o f chemical and mineral 
industries in total direct foreign investment in all industries (from 25.7% to 26.5%). Other recent 
studies concluded that there was little evidence o f industrial relocation because o f different 
environmental regulations.70
The second set o f questions is more relevant to Brazil. It  concerns the impact o f 
environmental regulations in industrial countries on competitiveness, employment and growth in 
developing countries. There are two important issues (i) the costs o f adjusting production processes 
to domestic environmental regulations o f importers and (ii) the arbitrary criteria for labeling of 
environmentally sound programmes - the so-called ecolabeling programmes. Although no conclusive 
studies exist, there are no doubts that adjustments to environmental preferences o f importers raise 
costs to exporters. It  is not clear, however, whether these costs affect the competitiveness of 
exporters.
A  study recently prepared by M otta Veiga et al. (1994) on the relationships between trade 
and the environment in the Brazilian case reached the following conclusions: (i) the level o f 
specialization o f the Brazilian economy is high; (ii) its exports are predominantly composed o f  
products intensive in the use o f natural resources and energy; (iii) a significant part o f products 
exported by Brazil are homogeneous products with high scales o f production, and minor possibilities 
o f product differentiation and, (iv) price differentials explain most o f the Brazilian competitiveness in 
international markets. Therefore, Brazilian exports are vulnerable to the imposition o f environmental 
standards by importers. In particular, for steel industries, environmental restrictions will reduce the 
comparative advantage o f Brazilian industry i f  importers decide to impose technical standards and 
energy requirements that are incompatible with the availability o f resources in the country.71
Both public and private sectors in Brazil are aware o f the importance o f environment 
preservation.72 A  recent survey among Brazilian large corporations showed that there has been 
increasing concern within those companies for the importance o f environmental variables in the
70 Markandya (1994: 13) quoted a study by Grossman and Krueger on the maquiladora programme which allowed
United States firms to locate in M exico, near the frontier with the United States, on advantageous terms. The study found 
"that pollution abatement costs were not a significant determinant o f the trade generated by the programme" (Grossman, 
G. and A. Krueger (1992), "Environmental impacts o f a North American Free Trade Agreement"in P. Garber (ed.), T h e U S -  
M exico Free Trade Agreement. M IT  Press, Cambridge, Massachusets).
7! Motta Veiga, Pedro da, M arta  Reis Castilho e Galeno Ferraz Filho (  1994), Relationships between trade and the
environment: The Brazilian case. Fundação Centro de Estudos do Comércio Exterior (F U N C E X ), R io de Janeiro, Texto 
opara Discussão n. 93, July, pp. 5-31.
72 The new Brazilian Constitution o f 1988 included environmental protection in several o f its provisions. Article
225 §3, 5, L X X I I I  and 225 § 1, IV . In  1981 Brazil defined a national policy on environment (M ay 31 st) (Law 6.938) and 
established a National Environmental System.
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definition o f their competitive edge.73 It  is important to stress that the main Brazilian development 
bank (the National Bank o f Economic and Social Development - B N D ES) offers credit lines for 
pollution abatement programmes developed by public agencies, and also for projects to rectifying 
environmental liabilities incurred by industries, besides environmental investments within new 
industrial projects.74 As expected, the major recipients o f those credit lines were the industries o f pulp 
and paper, iron and steel and chemicals and petrochemicals.75
The study showed that the good export performance o f Brazilian iron and steel industry 
resulted from intensive exploitation o f natural resources, with a technology that is potentially polluting 
and without investments in liquid wastes control equipment. Moreover, Brazil makes intensive use 
o f charcoal, which includes the forest devastation as an additional problem for the sector.76 However, 
the industry is getting prepared to invest more in pollution-reducing equipment. And, on the other 
hand, due to the widespread use o f hydroelectric sources o f energy Brazilian steel mills produce low 
C 0 2  emission levels.
A  survey conducted by M otta Veiga et al., early in 1994, with the major iron and steel 
companies concluded that they had not yet faced environmental obstacles from importers, mostly 
because the European Union is not the principal market for those Brazilian exports. Only one firm was 
expecting that up to 50% o f its exports could be subject to environmental restrictions from European 
countries. However, the steel industry, as a whole, has faced important non-tariff mechanisms such 
as voluntary export restriction and anti-dumping investigations.77 Besides, Brazilian iron and steel 
industry sought international outlets for its products due to the stagnation o f Brazilian market. 
Entrepreneurs prefer to sell homogeneous iron and steel goods in the domestic market and compete 
in international markets for higher valued added products.
Another sector that may be vulnerable to environmental restrictions is pulp and paper.78 
More than 87% o f Brazilian pulp exports go to OECD markets. European Union countries are major
73 The survey covered the 23 major Brazilian industrial groups operating in 34 industrial sectors. Sixty one per 
cent o f  the sample had sales greater than 200 million dollars and most o f them had significant export activities. Almost 
80%  o f the firms interviewed answered that they already had implemented some form o f environmental policy and 74%  
stated that they had objective knowledge o f their environmental liabilities. The companies were aware o f the need to 
preempt restrictive trends related to environmental protection both in the country and abroad (M otta Veiga et al. (1994), 
1994: 52).
74 The powerful National Confederation o f Industry (C N I)  created a Permanent Com m ission o f Environment and 
Soil Use (Comissão Permanente de M eio Ambiente e Uso do Solo - C O P E M A ). The C O P E N A  is the representative o f C N I 
in the G A N A  (Supporting Group to Environmental Standards). The G A N A  is part o f the International Standard 
Organization (IS O ), which is responsible for the elaboration o f international environmental standards (Technical 
Committee 207)
75 M otta Veiga et al. (1 9 9 4 ), 1994: 56.
76 Brazilian legislation requires that all charcoal consumed by steel m ills should originate from non-native forests. 
Reforestation or forest management w ill become mandatory after 1998 (M otta  Veiga et al. ( 1994), 1994: 71 ).
77 M otta Veiga et al. ( 1994), 1994: 67.
78 Brazil ranks the 13th among world paper producers and the 8th among world pulp producers. In  1993, Brazilian
paper production totalled 5.4 billion o f tons while pulp prodution totalled 5.0 billion o f tons (M otta Veiga et al. (1994), 
1994:89).
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consumers o f those Brazilian exports (45%); the United States absorb almost 30% and Japan 14%. 
The geographical distribution is a little different for paper exports: Latin American countries account 
for 34%  whereas European countries account for another 31%. Large and vertically integrated 
companies produce paper from their own forests. They have introduced environmental elements in 
their corporate strategies. They developed timber growing techniques and new species. Those firms 
have encouraged the production o f high yield pastes; upgraded paper quality while reducing the 
discharge o f liquid waste and the level o f chlorine in finished products. A  major problem that the 
industry may face in the future will be the imposition o f more stringent environmental standards and 
regulations with the mandatory use o f recycled fibers.79 Also, the international campaign by NGOs 
against massive forest devastation in Brazil affects negatively the Brazilian imports o f pulp and paper 
products in spite o f high investments by Brazilian companies in the administration o f manmade, 
ecologically sustainable forests.80
A  major concern among pulp and paper producers is their vulnerability to trade barriers 
aiming at changing production methods.81 For instance, the Brazilian Pulp Exporters Association finds 
that ecolabeling and environmental quality certifications are important instruments but that they should 
be based on transparent, nondiscriminatory and technical criteria that include non-European conditions 
o f production. Currently, to qualify for an eco-label, a product has to show that it does not have more 
than a given amount o f "load points" (penalties) which are the result o f a set o f parameters. It  is in the 
formulation o f those parameters that Brazilian producers fear that there is great opportunity for 
discretionary action.82
The M otta  Veiga et al. (1994) study concluded that Brazilian exports are less vulnerable 
when restrictive standards refer to products but more vulnerable when importers decide to act on 
production methods. Therefore, environmental restrictions which discriminates against productive 
processes act as trade barriers. They cannot be considered legitimate since the emission o f pollutants 
is confined within domestic boundaries and are not global in nature.83
Trade and Labour Conditions
The United States tried unsuccessfully to introduce the topic o f workers' rights in 1986, at 
the end o f the preparatory work for the Uruguay Round. More recently, backed by France, the United 
States delegation tried to include the "social clause" in the final draft on the mandate o f the future 
W TO . In  the first case, Brazil and India led the reaction against that inclusion. In the second case, 
Brazil, India and other Asian countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia were helped by the opposition 
o f Germany and England to state-promoted convergence in labour standards. Nevertheless, the
79 In  1991, Germany adopted a legislation forcing manufacturers to consume secondary fibers - scraps and 
recycled materials (M otta Veiga et al. (1994 ), 1994: 102).
80 M otta Veiga et al. ( 1994), 1994: 101 - 103.
81 See Procópio Filho, Argemiro (coord.) ( 1994), Ecoprotecionismo: Comércio Intemaiconal. Agricultura e M eio
Ambiente. Relatónos de Pesquisas , Estudos de Política Agrícola n. 17, IP E A , Brasilia, (Projeto P N U D /B R A /9 1 / 0 14).
82 M otta Veiga et al. (1994), 1994: 107.
83 M otta Veiga et al. (  1994), 1994: 121.
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discussion was just postponed. It  cannot be ignored that the issue o f labour conditions, social 
protection or social clause is part o f the W TO  negotiating agenda.
The debate is framed in North-South terms as all industrial countries had the best labour 
conditions and all developing countries had none. That represents a drastic change with the past since 
as the late Ambassador Nogueira Batista remarked: (i) attempts to create uniform labour standards 
and uniform international competitive conditions are as old as the introduction o f domestic social 
legislation in individual countries; and (ii) historically the "social clause" debate started as a problem 
between industrial countries, which were the first to introduce labour legislation.84
Switzerland was the first country to introduce working hour regulations and also a specific 
legislation for female and children labour in 1877. The enaction o f that legislation led the Swiss 
government to promote the discussion o f uniform labour standards in Europe. That country tried to 
gain the support o f other major European countries for an international conference on that issue, first 
in 1881 and later in 1889. It  was only after Germany had adopted, under Bismarck, a broad social 
legislation that the first intergovernmental conference on labour conditions was held in 1890. Later, 
in 1919 the equalization o f labour costs through uniform labour regulations was sponsored by the 
newly created agency, the future International Labour Organization (ELO).85
Labour conditions were equalized among advanced European countries mostly due to 
pressures from workers organized in trade unions, but also because o f higher levels o f productivity 
allowed by technological change. International agreements on labour conditions were not major 
instruments for greater convergence on labour conditions across countries. Moreover, while 
developing countries remained commodity exporters, no concern for the adoption o f "internationally 
recognized labour standards" was expressed by industrial countries. Only recently, with the emergence 
o f newly industrializing countries able to compete in international markets those concerns were 
trivialized in ambiguous expressions such as "social dumping".
Trade and fair conditions o f labour were linked in the Havana Charter but the wording was 
cautious.86 Besides, the focus was on the quality o f the employment to be created and not on unfair 
practices from trading parties. Although statements o f intentions to upgrade labour conditions patterns 
were introduced in some commodity agreements, the first agreement to contain clauses related to
84 N ogueira Batista, Paulo (1994 ), " Cláusula social e comércio internacional: uma antiga questão sob nova
roupagem" in Política Externa, vol. 3, n. 2, September, pp. 36-54.
85 However, only in 1934 the United States became a formal member o f IL O  (Nogueira Batista, 1994: 40).
86 The title o f Chapter I I  was Employment and Economic Activity in which the importance o f the maintenance 
o f domestic employment and the avoidance o f unemployment and underemployment should not be a matter o f domestic 
concern only. A rticle 7 on Fair Labour Standards stated that : "(1). The M em bers recognize that measures relating to 
em ploym ent must take fully into account the rights o f workers under inter-governmental declarations, conventions and 
agreements. They recognize that all countries have a common interest in the achievement and amintenance o f fair labour 
standards related to productivity, and thus in the improvement o f wages and working conditions as productivity may 
perm it. The Members recognize that unfair labour conditions, particularly in production for export, create difficulties in 
international trade, and, accordingly, each M em ber shall take whatever action may be appropriate and feasible to eliminate 
such conditions within its territory."
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labour standards was the Caribbean Basis Initiative, in 1983, in the context o f preferential trade 
agreements. Later, in 1984 the United States legislation included minimum labour standards that a 
developing country should fulfill to benefit from preferential access to United States market.
The 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act in Section 1001 established several 
negotiating objectives regarding workers' rights.87 Nevertheless, the landmark is the N A F T A  side 
agreement on labour standards (as well as one on Environmental Cooperation).88 The Agreement 
includes issues such as restrictions on child labour, health and safety standards, and minimum wages. 
In addition, the agreement established procedural mechanisms for enforcement. "Moreover, the United 
States retained its right to use domestic trade laws, such as Section 301 o f the 1974 trade act, with 
respect to labour issues not covered under N A FTA ."89
There are several aspects o f that emphasis on labour standards that should be considered. 
First, it is unlikely that any nation would be willing to compete on low-wage labour i f  a different 
alternative were available.90 Historical factors explain a prevailing pattern o f income distribution that 
have to be analyzed if  a better distribution is wanted. Second, labour standards and wage levels do 
not seem to keep a positive correlation. Also, market-oriented policies for greater efficiency and those 
for higher labour standards do not necessarily converge. Market-oriented policies demand greater 
flexibility in labour markets whereas labour standards create rigidities for labour mobility.
Income distribution in Latin American has been a major concern o f ECLAC from its 
inception. A  vast amount o f empirical and theoretical work on income distribution in Latin America 
over several decades refined the number and quality o f explanatory variables. Domestic variables such 
as agrarian structure, consumption patterns o f the ruling classes, together with exogenous variables 
such as international demand and the terms o f trade between commodities and manufactured goods 
were introduced to explain the structure o f income distribution. The region has the worst income 
distribution among developing countries: the share of total income received by the poorest 20% in the
87 "(A) to promote respect for worker rights; (B ) to secure a review o f  the relationship o f worker rights to G A T T
articles, objectives, and related instruments with a view to ensuring that the benefits o f the trading system are available 
to a ll workers; and (C ) to adopt, as a principle o f the G A T T , that the denial o f worker rights should not be a means for 
a country or its industries to gain competitive advantage in international trade." (U N C T A D  (1988), The U.S. Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act o f 1988: Its Implications for Developing Countries and the Uruguay Round o f M ultilateral 
Trade Negotiations, doc. U N C T A D  M T N /IN T .C B . 12, October, p. 89.)
88 The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation maintains all existing U.S. health, safety, and
environmental standards. "It allows States and cities to enact even tougher standards, while providing mechanisms to 
encourage all parties to harmonize their standards upward..." (United States Government, 1994: 228-229).
89 United States Government, 1994: 228.
90 The definition o f international competitiveness in the 1985 Report o f  the United Nations President's
Commission on Industrial Competitiveness has a broad consensus: "Competitiveness is the degree to which a nation can, 
under free and fair market conditions, produce goods and services that meet the test o f international markets while 
simultaneously maintaining or expanding the real incomes o f its citizens. "(United States Congress (1992 ), Competing 
Economies. America. Europe, and the Pacific R im . Office o f Technology Assessment, Washington, D . C., p. 3).
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late 1970s was lower in Latin America than in any other part o f the developing world. Moreover, that 
percentage was systematically reduced over the period 1960 to 1978.91
Brazil is outstanding in terms o f its impressively skewed income distribution.92 Nevertheless, 
the country has signed, ratified and implemented most o f the international labour conventions.93 In  
addition, abundant raw materials and cheap energy rather than pure labour exploitation explain part 
o f the country's comparative advantage.94
Contrasting to that debate, a recent study by the World Bank concluded that market-oriented 
policies in Latin America should include labour deregulation. The study described Latin American 
highly regulated labour market as opposed to the extreme flexibility o f the successful East Asian 
economies - Hong Kong, Indonesia, the Republic o f Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan (China), and 
Thailand.95 Therefore, it is remarkable that East Asian countries, with lower labour standards could 
present a continuously better pattern o f income distribution than Latin American countries.96
Finally, it is ironic that labour standards in developing countries could become a threat to 
those o f workers in industrial countries. In 1948, Raúl Prebisch before joining EC LA C  as the 
Executive Secretary, wrote the seminal study The Economic Development o f Latin America and Its 
Principal Problems.97 There, Prebisch analysed the distribution o f productivity gains between industrial 
and developing countries. Institutional arguments were put forwards to explain the persistence o f  
higher wages in industrial countries despite the economic cycle. Higher levels o f labour organization 
in industrial countries prevented the contraction o f wages in those countries whereas lack o f 
organization among the workers employed in primary production prevented them from increasing their 
income.98 A  continuous fall in the terms o f trade o f commodities exported by developing countries and
91 The share o f the lowest 20%  o f Latin American population in the total income received in the region was 3.7%
in 1960,3.4%  in 19707 and 2.9%  in 1978 (W orld  Bank (1993), Latin Am erica and the Caribbean A Decade A fter the D ebt 
Crisis. Washington, D . C ., table 8.1, p. 118).
92 Gini coefficient in Brazil is the highest in South America and it deteriorated further over the 1980s: it was 0.575
in the early 1980s and it increased to 0 .625 in the ¡ate 1980s (W orld  Bank, 1993, table 8.5, p. 120).
93 The experienced Ambassador Nogueira Batista believed that Brazil and other Latin American countries were
in a good position to preempt further moves by industrial countrie. Latin American countries should advance a precise 
definition o f "social dumping" in W T O . H e suggested that a first step could be the G A T T  definition o f dumping. A  
relationship between G A T T A V T O  and IL O  analogous to that o f G A T T /IM F  could also be adopted. H e mentioned that 
Brazil and other Latin American countries rank first among countries w ith the highest number o f ratification o f IL O  
Conventions. In  contrast, the U nited States ratified just nine out o f 170 conventions (Nogueira Batista, 1994: 52-53).
94 See Coutinho, Luciano and Joao Carlos Ferraz (coords.) (1 9 9 4 ) Estudo da Competitividade da Indústria
Brasileira. Papirus, Sao Paulo, pp. 261 -310.
95 W orld Bank, 1993: 92-97.
96 The share o f income for the highest 10% was 27.5%  in the Republic o f Korea (1976 ) whereas it was 50 .6%  in
Brazil (1 9 7 2 ) (W orld  Bank, 1993: table 8.2, p. 118).
97 H e  had been hired as a consultant for EC LA C , to prepare a background paper for the Havana Conference on 
Trade. (Furtado, Celso (1985 ), A  Fantasia Organizada. Editora Paz e Terra, São Paulo, pp. 53-63).
98 "The grater ability  o f the masses in the cyclical centres to obtain rises in wages during the upswing and to 
maintain the higher level during the downswing and the ability o f these centres, by virtue o f the role they play in 
production, to divert cyclical pressure to the periphery (causing a greater reduction o f income of the latter than in that
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exchanged by manufactured goods imported from industrial countries underscored income levels 
discrepancies. For many decades, an emotional debate on the impact o f the unequal exchange 
between industrial and developing countries on higher income o f workers in industrial countries was 
pursued until eventually it faded out by the end o f the 1970s." It  was implicit that the quality o f life 
o f workers in industrial countries was based upon lower wages in developing countries On the other 
hand, the latter were a consequence o f unequal terms o f trade between unprocessed and processed 
goods.100 By the end o f the 1970s, the debate became irrelevant because o f the rapid deterioration o f 
employment and workers' income in industrial countries.101
4. T H E  R E G IO N  AS A  S M A L L  G R O U P  F O R  P O L IC Y  H A R M O N IZ A T IO N
It  was explained elsewhere that the motivations for nations getting into regional 
arrangements are radically different from those that attracted them to preferential trading blocs in the 
interwar period.102 Therefore, analogies with the past do not provide insights to the current movement 
o f regionalism. The current trend occurs within a wide process of trade liberalization, in terms o f tariff 
reductions and drastic elimination o f non-tariff barriers. Consequently, those regional arrangements 
do not aim at preferential access only, but to facilitate the free movement o f goods, services, capital 
and labour. Nevertheless, it should not be neglected that current regionalism emerged in the 
environment o f uncertainties and complexities o f world politics. Therefore, there is an implicit 
defensive aspect in the reinforcement o f regional and subregional initiatives between developing 
countries as the result o f protectionism in industrial countries and the attempt by powerful nations to 
consolidate regional areas o f influence.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade provides for customs unions and free trade 
areas, as the major exception to the fundamental principle o f M F N  treatment. As o f the beginning o f 
1994, almost all o f GATT's 115 contracting parties were members o f at least one preferential trade 
agreement, with the preferred vehicle being free trade areas (free-trade areas outnumbered five-to-one 
customs unions). There were several areas o f concern: (i) the potential for diversion o f investment 
capital away from third parties to members o f regional agreements; (ii) that demands for protection 
by sectors undergoing adjustment within the regional arrangement could be borne primarily by third
o f the centres) explain why income at the centres persistently tends to rise more than in the countries o f the periphery, 
as happened in the case o f Latin America.” (Prebish, Raul (1950), "The Economic Development o f Latin America and Its 
Principal Problems" in Economic Bulletin for Latin America, vol. V II ,  n. 1, February, p. 6)
99 See Emmanuel, Arghiri ( 1972) Unequal Exchange A  Study o f the Imperialism o f Trade. Monthly Review Press, 
N ew  York.
100 A  logical consequence o f Prebisch' s argument was that the working-class o f developing countries was 
"exploited" by the working-class in industrial countries.
101 "From 1947 to 1973 the real income o f the median American fam ily increased by a robust 2 .8%  a year, more
than doubling. In  contrast, from 1973 to 1992 the income o f the typical American family was essentially stagnant, rising 
by only 0.1 percent a year after adjusting for inflation." (United States Government, 1994: 115).
102 Lawrence, 1991: 31.
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party suppliers and, (iii) the scope for trade diversion linked to the rules o f origin that members o f  
such arrangements are required to agree and administer.103
E C LA C , in a recent document called open regionalism "a process o f growing 
interdependence at the regional level, promoted both by preferential integration agreements and by 
other policies in a context o f liberalization and deregulation, geared towards enhancing the 
competitiveness o f the countries o f the region and, in so far as possible, constituting the building 
blocks for a more open and transparent international economy."104
Another aspect which should not be overlooked is that regional initiatives can be functional 
to the process o f unilateral liberalization, as it happened in major Latin American economies. On the 
one hand, regional and subregional free-trade arrangements lend credibility to domestic liberalization 
policies. Commitments at a regional and subregional levels will necessarily raise the costs o f violating 
agreements. Foreign investors, but also local entrepreneurs and interest groups will take seriously the 
liberalization intentions o f governments when these domestic intentions are sanctioned by regional and 
subregional instruments. On the other hand, they may contribute for a more gradual opening o f the 
economies and help governments to better identify the impact o f exposing the local industry to foreign 
competition. In the case o f the MERCOSUR (the Southern Cone Common M arket) formed by Brazil, 
Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, the establishment o f an effective timetable for tariff reduction, 
which was automatic and applied across-sectors sent a clear message to Brazilian entrepreneurs that 
governments o f those countries were seriously decided to open their markets to foreign 
competition.105 Later on, the negotiations for a common external tariff reinforced the message.
Latin American countries accounted for a great part o f Brazilian exports up to the debt crisis 
o f the 1980s: those markets consumed roughly 18% o f Brazilian exports in 1980; that share decreased 
to 8.7% in 1985 to increase gradually to 23 .5% in 1993. Furthermore, this is a direction o f trade for 
Brazilian exports with a higher proportion o f manufactures: 85% o f those exports are composed o f 
manufactured goods.106 The four countries o f the M ERCO SUR accounted for an average o f 4%  o f 
Brazilian exports in the period 1982-1990, whereas in 1993 they accounted for almost 14% o f the
103 Speech o f the Director-General o f the G A T T  on Regional Integration and the W T O , given to the third
Euro-Latin American Forum in Sao Paulo, July 7, 1994, G A T T  W T O  News. July 7, 1994 (G W /03 ).
104 E C L A C , 1994:8 .
105 The Asumpcion Treaty was signed on M arch 1991. It  contained a Programme o f Trade Liberalization (Annex
I, article 3, which defined a timetable o f tariff reduction starting in June 1991 with a reduction o f  47%  and finishing at 31 st 
December 1994 w ith 100%. A  reduced list o f exceptions for each country was defined in article 6, but that list should be 
decreased yearly by a given proportion defined in article 7. For more information on the M E R C O S U R  formation see Hirst, 
M onica (1993), "Avances y desafios en la formación del M E R C O S U R " in Bouzas, R. (ed.) Los Procesos de Integración 
Economica en America I  .atina. C E D E A L , M adrid, pp. 35-76; B razil, M inistry o f Foreign Relations, Boletim de Integração 
Latino-Americana, various issues.
106 See Ventura-Dias, Vivianne (ed.) (1 9 8 9 ) South-South Trade - Trends. Issues, and Obstacles to Its Growth.
Praeger, N ew  York, for a discussion o f the composition o f exports according to directions o f trade.
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total.107 Argentina is now the second largest Brazilian trading partner and that bilateral trade amounts 
to $ 6.34 billion.108 Brazilian exports to Paraguay ($ 1.2 billion) are now greater than those to France 
and the bilateral trade with Uruguay is greater than that with Canada or Spain.109 Moreover, trade 
with Latin American countries explained most o f the recent growth o f Brazilian exports, since the 
value o f its exports to other directions o f trade has remained almost stable.
There is no space in this paper for a review o f the M ER C O SU R  experience that is manifold. 
M y  purpose here is to highlight the interesting learning process that has been taking place in the 
subregion on the subject o f policy coordination and harmonization.110 Initially, emphasis was laid on 
macroeconomic coordination, particularly because the high levels o f inflation in Brazil until the middle 
o f 1994, as compared with the successful stabilization programme in Argentina, could threaten the 
sustainability o f integration efforts. Moreover, trade unbalances between Brazil and Argentina 
between 1992 and 1993 favoured Brazil, due to Argentine overvalued exchange-rate. These trade 
superávits created frictions between the two countries.111 Therefore, the coordination o f  
macroeconomic policies gained prominence in academic and governmental spheres.
Although the topic o f macroeconomic coordination is extremely important, I  am more 
concerned with the harmonization o f microeconomic and non-economic domestic policies that 
eventually will affect the competitiveness o f member countries.112 The information is scanty and can 
only be inferred from the available documentation on the various negotiations.
It  should be explained that the Asumpcion Treaty is an instrument for the establishment o f 
the M ERCO SUR. Therefore, the institutional structure created with the Treaty, including a dispute 
settlement mechanism, is o f provisional nature.113 The organization is intergovernmental with
107 The share o f the subregion on Brazilian imports remained almost stable around 10 to 13% over the period 1989- 
1993 (data from  M inistério da Industria, do Comércio e do Turismo, Secretaria do Comércio Exterior, Departamento 
Técnico de Intercâmbio Comercial).
108 The U nited States is the first importing market accounting for 20.3%  o f Brazilian exports in 1993 whereas 
Argentina accounted for 9 .4%  (M IC T /S E C E X /D T IC ).
109 Denot Medeiros, José Arthur ( 1994), "A Area de Livre Comércio Sul-Americana: O  Imperativo e a Lógica da 
Cooperaçao Econômica Regional" in Boletim de Integração Latino Americana, n. 13, April-June, p. 2.
110 The Asum pcion Treaty defines in its article 1 that a Common M arket implies the free movement o f goods, 
services and productive factors between countries..;, the establishment o f a common external tariff and the adoption o f 
a common trade policy for third countries ...; the coordination among countries (Estados Partes) o f macroeconomic and 
setoral policies, including those related to foreign trade, agricultural, industrial, fiscal, monetary, exchange-rate and capital 
policies, besides those policies related to services, customs, transportation and communication and others as agreed, 
with a view to ensure adequate conditions o f competition among member countries and a commitment o f member 
countries (Estados Partes) to harmonize their legislations, in pertinent areas to strengthen the integration process (my 
translation).
111 P ara lle l negotiations between the two countries led to the reduction o f trade surplus favouring B razil and to 
the a more equilibrated bilateral trade.
112 See E C L A C  (1992 ) Ensayos sobre Coordinación de Politicas Macroeconômicas. Economic Commission tor 
Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago, Chile LC.G . 1740-P, December, United Nations Publication sales number 
S.92.II.G . 15, for general discussion on the coordination o f macroeconomic policies.
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minimum levels o f supranationality.114 Drafters o f the Asumpcion Treaty were careful in not g 
overburdening countries that did not have much experience in integrating their economies. The 
creation o f one international organization preceding the establishment o f the common market would 
be incompatible with the level o f cooperation and integration linkages relating future member 
countries.115 There is a Common Market Council (CM C) composed by Ministers o f Foreign Relations 
and Ministers o f Economy o f member countries and the Common Market Group (G M C ), coordinated 
by the Ministry o f Foreign Relations, with eight members nominated by each country116. The Decisions 
enacted by the CM C prevail over the Resolutions and Recommendations emanating from the G M C .117 
That institutional structure is extremely flexible since the Council can also create other organisms as 
required to fulfill the objectives o f "the final constitution o f the Common Market".118
The Annex V  o f the Treaty created ten Working Groups with the stated purpose o f 
coordinating macroeconomic and sectoral policies covering the following issues: 1. trade; 2. customs;
3. technical norms; 4. trade-related aspects o f fiscal and monetary policies; 5. land transportation; 6. 
maritime transportation; 7. industry and technology policies (including the protection o f intellectual 
property rights); 8. agricultural policy; 9. energy policy and 10. coordination o f macroeconomic 
policies. The four years o f preparation for the M ER C O SU R  have resulted in a variety o f norms and 
uniform procedures in areas such as technical measures, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, labeling 
and packaging, integration o f customs procedures, and transportation modes. These legal norms, 
however, do not capture the richness o f the discussions in the Working Groups.119
Concerns with sustainable development and with the protection o f the environment are part 
of the M ERCOSUR initiative. The Asumpción Treaty contains a statement in its Preamble mentioning
113 Grebler, Eduardo ((1 9 9 4 ), "O Mercosul Institucional e a Solução de Controvérsias" in Boletim de Integração 
Latino Americana, n. 12, January-March, p. 4 5 ) refers to the fact that the M E R C O S U R  was not created as en entity with  
a legal personality but, as an agreement between States implying rights and obligations from one country to each other, 
to be complied by their respective governments.
114 There are no provisions in the Treaty for an automatic internalization o f decisions taken at the M E R C O S U R  
level. In  other words, there are no mechanisms to transform a regional norm into a domestic law. (Soares, Guido (1994 ), 
"A A tividade Norm ativa do Mercosul, nos dois Primeiros Anos de Vigência do Tratado de Assunção: U m  Balanço 
Positivo" in Integração Latino Americana, n. 12, January-March, p. 10).
115 Grebler, 1994:45 .
116 Four permanent members and four replacements.
117 Soares (1994: 11-12) recalled that according to the European Community Law  there is a difference between 
uniformize and harmonize. Rules aim at uniformizing the Community legislation whereas the directives aim at harmonizing 
legislative, regulatory and administrative measures in member countries. Rules are automatically enforced whereas 
directives depend on domestic institutions o f country members.
118 A rtic le  10 o f the Treaty. In the first two years, the C M C  created several M inisterial Conferences to solve 
problems o f  specific areas (among others, Treasury and Central Banks, Education, Justice, Labour and Agriculture). The 
stated objective o f the Decision when it created a M inisterial Conference o f Ministers o f Agriculture was to discuss the 
necessary measures for the harmonization o f agricultural policies o f member countries. The Decision n. 03/1991 o f the 
C M C  provided the normative framework for the establishment o f sectoral agreements which should become a framework 
for the negotiations o f convergence and conflicts o f interests between member countries in productive sector (Soares, 
1994: 12-13).
119 The quartely publication by the Brazilian Ministry o f Foreign Relations, Boletim de Integração Latino-Americana. 
presents a summary o f the m ajor events in each W orking Group.
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that the objective o f economic development should be met by the preservation o f the environment and 
a more effective use o f available resources. Cooperation in environmental protection has been 
discussed in various Working Groups dealing with: energy, agricultural and industrial and 
technological policies. In 1992, an especialized mechanism, a Conference (Reunión) on environmental 
matters was created (REM A). The first meeting was held in November 1993 with quarterly meetings 
ever since. The Conference was created as an instance o f consultation between governments o f 
member countries. Its objectives are to contribute to establish adequate competitiveness conditions 
in environmental matters (i) between member countries and (ii) vis-à-vis third countries.120
By the end o f 1994, the R E M A  decided that the disparities among the four countries, in 
terms o f environmental legislation, were too broad for any serious attempt o f harmonization in the 
short run. O f the four countries, Brazil is that with the most advanced and comprehensive 
environmental legislation. Brazil has a whole Chapter in its Constitution dedicated to the environment. 
States and local municipalities have also their own regulations.121
There is no explicit reference to social legislation in the Asumpcion Treaty. The Preamble 
contains vague allusions to social justice as part o f economic development and to the improvement 
o f social conditions o f the population o f the subregion. In  1991, the Working Group 11 was formed 
to respond to pressures from trade unions and NGOs. Initially, its objective was primarily to deal with 
labour matters, but later its mandate was extended to cover topics such as labour relations, 
employment and social security. Workers and employers have equitable representation in 
theCommissions.122 A  special group was created to study a Charter o f Fundamental Rights, inspired
120 The functions o f R E M A  are: (i) to identify and reach agreement on general and operational criteria to approach 
the environmental question in M E R C O S U R ; (ii)  to formulate and propose basic guidelines in environmental policy to 
contribute to the development o f a concerted management between member countries; (iii)  to coordinate environment-related 
work in the various W orking Groups o f the G M C ; (iv ) to identify and analyse, w ith the support o f various W orking Groups 
o f G M C  International Acts dealing with environmental matters and directly related to the objective o f M E R C O S U R  with the 
purpose o f formulating proposals to enable the harmonic internationalization o f the principles, mechanism, and procedures 
emanating from those Acts in member countries; (v ) to promote the incorporation o f environmental aspects in regional 
projects o f international cooperation in M ERCO SUR; (vi) to analyse the environmental legislation in member countries based 
on criteria agreed upon in R E M A  with the purpose o f identifying possible asymmetries or differentiated treatment and o f 
proposing the adoption o f common criteria to approach the problem; (v ii) to identify and propose actions, related to the 
objectives o f M E R C O S U R  to improve environmental conditions and (v iii) to promote activities to support environmental 
management when such activities w ill be related to more than one area in M E R C O S U R , such as education, research, 
information, capability creation, etc. (Boletim de Integração Latino-Am ericano. January-March 1994, n. 12, pp. 125-126, 
my translation from Spanish).
121 In  the final negotiations for the M E R C O S U R  a "destination rule" (regra de destino) accommodated the 
concerns o f  higher standard country. Any country member w ill have to comply with the regulations o f the importing 
country.
122 Santos, Roberto A . O  ( 1994), "Perspectivas do Mercosul: D ireito  Social do Tratado de Assunção" in Boletim  
de Integração Latino-Americana, n. 13, April-June, pp. 3 7 -3 8 ) showed that trade unions had difficulties to be included 
in the negotiations. Workers' participation was not part o f bilateral cooperation initiatives between the Argentine and 
Brazil from 1986 on. It  was only in 1992, after a series o f seminars was launched by N G O s and trade unions that employers 
and workers representatives were formally integrated in the W orking Group. This W orking Group was subdivided into 
eight Commissions focused on the following topics: labour and individual relations; labour and collective relations, 
em ployment and labour migrations, professional formation; occupational health and safety o f workers; social security;
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by the Community Charter o f the Fundamental Rights o f Workers (Social Charter)
The programme o f harmonization o f policies and legislations within the M ERCO SUR is vast. 
Each Working Group covers more than 10 items broken down in four to eight steps on average with 
a timetable attached (cronograma de Las Leñas).123 Negotiators from the four countries involved start 
their search for greater harmonization by the identification o f relevant domestic legislation and 
domestic policies. The second step is to proceed to a thorough examination o f asymmetries in the 
legislation and policies o f member countries as far as they affect the relative competitiveness o f each 
countiy. Although poorly documented, asymmetry studies proved to be an educational experiment 
for Brazilian academics and bureaucrats. Methods have tended to select the most comprehensive and 
integrated approach. In the evaluation o f relative Brazilian competitiveness in agriculture, for instance, 
agroindustry and agroindustrial systems were the basis o f those studies. Technical studies have tended 
therefore to emphasize the set o f interindustrial relations o f a given industry or sector rather than the 
industry itself. Therefore, the relevant legislation and policies usually cover a wide spectrum o f legal 
and technical instruments.
The process towards M ERCO SUR formation has been characterized by transparency o f 
methods and intense consultation among the four governments involved with a growing participation 
o f representatives o f legitimate social, economic and political interests o f the four nations. Moreover, 
the richness o f the process cannot be measured only by the above mentioned levels o f trade and 
investment nor by the evolution o f interfirm agreements. The consolidation o f the MERCOSUR, 
against all odds, is being pursued through a process o f learning and transformation in which market 
and state forces are reinforced to solve conflicts between member countries and create new 
opportunities for mutually advantageous cooperation.124
5 C O N C L U D IN G  R E M A R K S
The Miam i Summit was concluded on last December 11 with a commitment by 34 Latin 
American Heads o f government and o f States and the President o f the United States to create a Free 
Trade Agreement o f the Americas (FTA A ) until 2005.125 In 1988 the Bush Administration had
labour conditions in especific sectors and International Principles and Conventions. The IL O  was formally invited to 
participate as Observer in W orking Group 11.
123 The W orking Group on Technical Measures (n. 3) covers 20 items.
124 In the first week o f December 1994, the four Presidents o f M E R C O S U R  country members signed the Ouro Preto
Protocol that determined the end o f the transition period to the formal beginning o f the M E R C O S U R  (January first, 1995). 
The Ouro Preto Protocol supplements the Asumpcion Treaty and defines the new institutional system o f the M E R C O S U R . 
Most o f the existing institutions w ill remain: The Common M arket Council (C M C )and the Common M arket Group (G M C ). 
A  new organism created in August 1994 was added: the Trade Commission. It w ill be in charge o f the common external tariff, 
rules o f origin and the instruments for improved competition. The Protocol created a Consultive Social and Economic Forum, 
w ith  representatives o f entrepreneurs and workers to formulate recommendations to G M C . A fter the Protocol, the 
M E R C O S U R  has a legal personality. It  is entitled to sign trade agreements with other countries or groups o f countries.
125 The F T A A  w ill be built up from trade agreements between existing subregional integration schemes such as
M E R C O S U R , the Andean Group, C A R IC O M , N A F T A , the Central American Common Market.
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launched a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Area. However, the W H F T A  was not converted into a 
major component o f the United States foreign policy. Negotiations with the United States Congress 
for the ratification o f the N A F T A  and the Uruguay Round Agreements were time and energy 
consuming. In addition, Mexico was not willing to lose the advantages from preferential access to the 
United States market so soon.
Also, by middle November, representatives o f eighteen economies in the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (including two Latin American countries, Chile and Mexico) met in 
Indonesia.The APEC has Japan, the United States and China among its members.126 They decided to 
create a free trade area by 2020.127
Free trade areas have become so complex that regionalism cannot pose a threat for 
multilateral order. Regionalism and multilateralism shall continue to be partners and not opponents. 
G ÀTT rules have ensured that regional groupings develop in an open way by providing a framework 
of guidelines and procedures. Discussions on antidumping and countervailing duties in M ERCOSUR, 
for instance, are based on G A TT definitions, rules and procedures. Besides, agreements reached with 
the completion o f the Uruguay Round reduced the scope for granting preferential market access in 
a customs union or free-trade area.128 The Uruguay Round clarified and strengthened Article X X IV  
o f G A TT, which provides rules and disciplines for customs unions and free-trade areas.129
However, intense competition in international markets for similar products, globalization and 
interdependence are changing the nature o f the multilateral debate with the implicit purpose o f making 
competition harder for low-income countries. Linkages between trade measures, environment and 
labour protection affect the very determimnants o f comparative advantage in developing countries. 
Demands for higher environment and labour standards have cost implications for exporters.
Just after the end o f the Miami Summit, Republicans and Democrats began to discuss the 
inclusion o f environmental and labour standards clauses in the FTAA . Republicans will approve it i f  
no such clauses are included and Democrats will only approve it i f  the clauses are included. Latin 
American representatives asserted clearly that they would appreciate overall discussions about labour 
and environmental standards but only i f  they were not related to the F T A A .130
Developing countries became objects o f moralist campaigns that transform complex and 
historically rooted social problems into mere caricatures. Moreover, industrial countries deal with
126 APEC members are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, M exico, 
N ew  Zealand, Papua N ew  Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and the United States.
127 "APEC countries face challenges in creating Asian free-trade area" in The Journal o f Commerce. November
16, 1994.
128 This is true only for industrial countries.
129 Speech o f the Director-General o f the G A T T  on Regional Integration and the W T O , given to the third
Euro-Latin American Forum in Sao Paulo, July 7, 1994.
no "GOP Congress may block some Clinton trade goals" in The Journal o f Commerce. December 12, 1994.
those problems as their capital and their enterprises were not deeply involved in the dynamics o f 
income concentration, environmental degradation and low labour standards in most developing 
countries.
Except in text books o f international theory, countries are not supposed to face similar 
conditions o f prodution for trade to occur. I t  is the other way around. Differences in relative 
endowments o f productive factors determine the comparative advantages o f countries. Therefore, 
countries rich in raw material and unkilled labour would produce and export products intensive in 
those factors and import products intensive in factors which are scarce in the country.
The recent debate on levelling the playing field in terms o f "social protection" turns the 
theory upside down. First, the debate ignores differences in development levels o f countries involved; 
second it demands greater state participation for regulating and upgrading environment and labour 
conditions. Traditionally, freer trade depended on more market and less state. Finally, pressures from 
organized labour and environmentalists in industrial countries may force policy-makers in those 
countries to adopt unilateral trade measures, therefore disrupting multilateral rules.131
Environment and labour conditions are important topics for the quality o f life o f human 
beings to be transformed in threats to the trading system. There are alredy multilateral agreements on 
environmental protection that gradually industrial and developing countries will transform in domestic 
regulations. In the same way, the ILO  is the multilateral forum for negotiating labour standards. The 
employment o f unilateral measures to deal with any o f those issues will not contribute to improve 
international relations. Developing countries will look forwards to see how W TO  will perform betting 
on its effectiveness to protect them from arbitratry actions from powerful trading partners.
There are costs o f adjusting to a new global order; they are painful and normally, the most 
vulnerable social groups are those who bear the full costs. Workers in more traditional, import- 
competing industries like textiles and clothing are on average less skilled, less educated, lower paid, 
older, and more likely to be female or members o f minority groups. Trade can create new jobs in a 
greater proportion than it destroys. But those are completely different jobs, requiring different skills.
There are no short term solutions for complex problems. More and better education plans 
are required to upgrade the labour force so that the jobs created by the new information age will be 
matched by the pool o f existing resources. It  will take a long period for this kind o f policy to produce 
the desired effects. In the context o f long-term unemployment it will be difficult to form a consensus 
in industrial countries, on the importance o f trade, globalization and international competitiveness.
131 The United States legislation for the protection o f turtles ( Public Law 101 -162 , Novem ber 2 1 ,1 9 8 9 ) prevents
imports o f  prawns from countries that use fishing methods that may endanger certain species o f turtles. Countries are 
"convinced" to adopt a turtle excluder device (T E D ). This device increases oil consumption to up to 30% . Brazil, together 
w ith  other 14 Latin American countries are supposed to adopt the TE D . In the Brazilian case, field work demonstrated 
that there were no turtles in the area where prawns were fished. However, United States representatives were not 
convinced. Moreover, even though only the prawn production o f the North o f Brazil is exported, the United States 
required that the whole Brazilian prawn fishing fleet adopted the T E D . (In  Procópio Filho, (coord.) ( 1994), pp. 148-151).
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Several recent events suggest that ordinary people in those countries perceive market access, free 
trade and globalization as threats to their quality o f life: (i) the intense debate in the United States 
preceding the approval o f the N A F T A  and the Marrakesh Agreements and the difficult negotiations 
that followed for the approval by the Congress o f both agreements; (ii) the emergence and populart 
appeal o f populist politicians with protectionist and nationalist platforms132 and (iii) the rejection by 
Norwegian voters o f European Union membership.133
Slow growth and relatively high unemployment rates lead policymakers to provide short­
term answers to long-term problems. However, those may compound the problems rather than to be 
a path to construct real solutions. Imports from low-wage developing countries are perceived as 
threats to jobs and income levels o f workers even thought, in the United States, there is no conclusive 
evidence on the impact o f these imports on job losses.134 Also, as stated in the Economic Report o f 
the President Clinton, "most U.S. trade - about 60 per cent - still involves other industrialized 
countries whose skill levels and wages are similar to those in the United States".
Brazil has one o f the worst income distribution pattern in the world. The minimum wage in 
the country is also one o f the lowest by international standards and the lowest in the M ERCOSUR. 
Nevertheless, the country has one o f the most advanced legislation on environment, consumer 
protection, labour protection and social security. Production conditions are very heterogeneous in 
such a large and regionally contrasting country. Brazilian comparative advantage is still based on 
abundant raw materials, high scale o f production and cheap energy. The willingness o f importers to 
define methods of production and inputs will necessarily affect the future export performance o f the 
country.
132 In the United States, Ross Perot achieved an expressive number o f votes in the Presidential election o f 1992.
133 Norwegian voters (5 2 .5 %  voted N o) expressed fears o f exposing their welfare programmes, their political 
system, stringent environmental rules and generous farm subsidies to European rules and procedures.
13,1 For Krugman, Paul and Lawrence, Robert ( 1994) the reasons for the slowing down o f real income in the United
States are domestic ("Trade, Jobs and Wages" in Scientific American. A p ril, pp. 22 -27). Sachs, Jeffrey and Howard Shatz. 
(1 9 9 4 ) , "Trade and Jobs in U . S. Manufacturing" in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, pp. 1-84, found instead a 
positive association between foreign competition and job losses, particularly in low-skilled jobs although they agreed 
w ith  Krugman and Lawrence that technological change play a role independently o f internationalization.
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